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Plea Bargaining After Frye and Lafler, A Real
Problem in Search of a Reasonable and Practical
Solution (Meeting the Challenges of Frye and
Lafler)
The Honorable W. Louis Sands*
Good afternoon. I must say that I am not only honored to be
your keynote speaker, but I am humbled to have been included
with such a distinguished assembly of members of the academy. I
am well aware that I am not a member or even adjunct. It does,
however, give me the opportunity to share my views with those
who have given careful and reflective consideration to the subject
of this conference. It is also an indication that the sponsors of the
conference not only value the importance of plea bargaining as an
academic matter, but also recognize its practical implications.
Given that there are many opinions, views and criticisms of plea
bargaining, as indicated in Kyle's introduction,' I must confess
that I have negotiated pleas as a federal and state prosecutor, similarly as defense counsel and considered and imposed pleas and
recommended sentences as a judge in both courts and accepted
and rejected binding plea agreements in federal court.
As a judge, over the years I have addressed motions to withdraw
pleas and allegations of violations of plea agreements. You could
say that I have been around the block a few times. Based on those
experiences and the invitation to speak, I suppose it is a fair assumption that the purpose of the invitation was to invite me to
make some comments from my perspective and experience in response to Frye and Lafler.2 I will endeavor to do that. In turn, I
hope to learn a great deal from the in depth analysis and discussion of relevant constitutional principles and case precedent by
distinguished legal scholars who have also been invited. In other
* United States District Court, Middle District of Georgia. This is the Keynote Address that Judge Sands delivered at the Duquesne University School of Law Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye Symposium on February 28, 2013.
1. Kyle R. Bahr worked as a clerk for Judge Sands from 2009 to 2011. Attorney Bahr
is an associate at the law firm of Reed Smith in the Pittsburgh office and introduced Judge
Sands at the start of the symposium.
2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
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words, I look forward to this being a mutually beneficial conference.
As background, we all know that the Supreme Court recognized
and declared through numerous opinions issued over the decades
the right to and the extent of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Chief among those were cases such as Powell v. Alabama' and Glasser v. United States.4 Effective assistance requires
counsel assistance at a time early enough and under circumstances such that it provides effective aid in the preparation as well as
at the trial itself. The Court declared that judicial denial of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was a violation of
the Sixth Amendment. The right of counsel was expanded to include an equal protection right of effective assistance of appellate
counsel. In effect, historically, the Court has recognized a constitutional right to effective counsel coextensively with all proceedings and circumstances where the court found that counsel could
not underperform to the detriment of his or her client whether
counsel was private or appointed.
Where there is a right to effective counsel based on the Constitution, that is, based on fairness grounded in the Sixth Amendment or based on due process or equal protection-where neither
appointed nor retained counsel is permitted to undercut the right
by providing ineffective assistance of counsel-the defendant's
right is protected and may not be violated. To the contrary, where
proceedings or activities are not connected to a constitutional
ground, or right, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. However, some cases do suggest that where due
process is required but counsel is not, yet counsel is nevertheless
present, a claim for violation of due process based on counsel's ineffectiveness may be possible even though relief is not available
through a direct claim on ineffective assistance grounds. That is,
there are circumstances where, arguably, the lawyer's ineffectiveness can be the basis of a due process violation where there was no
right to counsel. Admittedly, these are outliers.
Frye and Lafler changed the theretofore traditional review that
had been previously closely linked to the trial. The Sixth Amendment now reaches and includes plea bargaining, at least with respect to defense counsel's performance.

3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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We have been under a constitutional form of government for
well over 200 years. With that in mind, we also note that there
are differing schools of thought regarding just how to appropriately interpret and apply constitutional principles. These approaches
underpin the differing views expressed by the majority and the
dissent, not only in Frye and Lafler, but in many areas of the
Court's decision making. There are, of course, variations and hybrids of these approaches but they can usually be condensed into
two basic approaches: one seeks to apply an original view and the
other views the Constitution as living or adaptable. Although
both schools concede that much has changed in our society since
1791, they differ sharply as to whether and how the Constitution
should be interpreted to apply, or respond to, those changes.
The Constitution grants not only the right to a trial, but also the
right to a "fair trial." For more than 200 years through statutes
and the interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court,
what is or is not a fair trial has been defined. The Court has done
so largely through direct application of the Sixth Amendment and
less directly through application of due process via the Fifth
Amendment and by extension to the states through Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection. Therefore, questions about fairness in the criminal justice system have been addressed essentially with respect to how directly they relate to the
trial stage or to those proceedings that are considered to be closely
associated with the trial or the first appeal.
Similarly, the Court's Sixth Amendment-based recognition and
development of the right to counsel have resulted also in the
Court's review of effective assistance of counsel as one defined and
closely associated with the actual trial and first appeal. Therefore, the quality of activities such as plea bargaining, until Lafler
and Frye, have been largely considered without effect where they
were followed by a trial and the trial itself was determined to have
been fair and thus having met the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment. Thus, even if counsel may have been ineffective in
some aspect of the overall proceeding, a defendant convicted at
trial was without a remedy for counsel's ineffectiveness if it could
be said that counsel's ineffectiveness did not cause the unfavorable result. That is, if the defendant otherwise received a fair trial
under the then current view of Sixth Amendment fairness, due
process, or equal protection, there was no constitutional violation.
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The Court set out in Strickland' the test for determining whether counsel has provided effective assistance. Although often criticized, Strickland is consistent with the Sixth Amendment trial
review approach. Did counsel's performance fall below or outside
the professional norm, and, even if it did, did it place the outcome
in doubt? In other words, would the result have been different,
but for counsel's ineffective performance? If the results would
have been the same, the trial was fair and the defendant must
accept the result insofar as the question of ineffective assistance of
counsel. With this as background, it is no wonder that the Supreme Court's decisions in Frye and Lafler were hailed as significant, although there is some disagreement on the question of how
significant.
It is doubtful that many would deny that the plea-bargaining,
which is so much a part of today's criminal justice system, both
state and federal, is very different from practices familiar to or
even contemplated by the founders. That, again, is why I believe
the differing views regarding appropriate constitutional interpretation bore so heavily on the bright line revealed in the opinions
as expressed by the majority and minority in these two cases.
However, whether it was 9 to 0 or 5 to 4, the majority controls.
Simply put, I believe the majority, recognized that we are now,
and have been for some time, in an era of criminal case disposition
by plea-bargain rather than disposition by trial. Can a criminal
justice system remain effective, be fair, have legitimacy or be adequately assessed where judicial review is limited to the application of a constitutional right that is recognized and given effect
only when it is tightly and strictly tied to the trial stage where
only five percent or less of cases result in a trial? Disposition by
trial may be our historical tradition, but plea bargaining is our
modern reality. Based on this reality, we could reasonably have
anticipated a Lafler or Frye at some point.
Before further discussing my views on these cases and the possible responses to them, I would like to take a few minutes and
share with you some of my observations of what is actually involved in today's plea bargaining. What is the nature and reality
of present-day plea bargaining? The activity can range from that
of highly sophisticated negotiations, reduced to written "mortgagelength" agreements between tough, experienced prosecutors and
capable, well-healed, well-informed and experienced defense at5.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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torneys who are often former highly successful and effective prosecutors, to informal discussions between a prosecutor and an unsophisticated, uneducated and even naive pro se defendant that take
place just before a case is called for trial. These informal oral
agreements are loosely formed and often are absent any real discussion of possible consequences. Possible consequences are left to
the judge to address later in the plea colloquy. The latter cases
are likely to involve fines, expected probation or time-served sentences. As a part of these informal negotiations, the defendants
may also, in effect, waive their right to counsel during the negotiations and waive counsel before the court.
Although most defendants are accorded legal representation,
particularly in connection with felonies, the abilities, talent, and
experience of their attorneys may vary vastly. The lawyers' familiarity with and understanding of the criminal process itself, and
sometimes more importantly, the practices, personalities, traditions and policies of the particular jurisdiction or court, may also
vary widely or be virtually nonexistent. The attitudes of the trial
judges and their attention to the overall process also cover a broad
spectrum. The length of sentence may depend a great deal on
which judge entertains the plea, when the plea occurs, and what
specific charge or charges to which the defendant pleads.
State or federal sentencing policies may have an impact or even
be controlling. The needs or goals of the prosecutor may have an
impact on the offer. Potential evidentiary, witness, trial or appellate issues may have an impact. In sum, there are innumerable
factors, variables and considerations that may possibly impact, in
varying degrees, whether an offer is made, the quality and quantity of the offer, and the resulting actual sentence. There may even
be the possibility of negotiating a total dismissal of charges.
Practitioners are familiar with many slogans. Often in the old
days, the advice given to counsel for defendants in multipledefendant cases was that "the hog that reaches the trough first,
gets the longest drink." The point was that a defendant did not
want to be last to seek a plea deal. There may be nothing left to
"drink" in the way of a favorable offer from the prosecutor. To the
contrary, on occasion it is the defendant who holds out who gets
the best deal. Add to this competition among defendants, attorney
blustering, legal threats and counterthreats, tactics, bluffs and
lawyer jousting, you can easily see that each case, as to each defendant, has many possible favorable and unfavorable outcomes
short of trial.
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There are also practical considerations. For instance, some defendants have no concern about the charge or its possible future
impact so long as they are able to initially avoid jail, go home or go
away for what they consider to be a relatively short period of time.
Others are so repulsed by or fearful of being labeled a criminal or
going to jail that they become immobilized, unwilling or unable to
even contemplate pleading guilty even where there is a favorable
offer on the table given the defendant's actual circumstances. Still
others approach the choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial
as a lottery, either risking all and going to trial as a long shot at
acquittal or taking a deal as a safe bet in favor of a known outcome when the actual possibility of acquittal might be significant.
Add the weight of the judge's discretion to the mix of lawyers of
varying abilities, experiences and effectiveness, prosecutorial interests and policies, and the defendant's own preference. There
are judges known for leniency in sentencing and judges known for
maximum sentences, judges who sentence in between and judges
who unpredictably bounce to the extremes. Not surprisingly then,
plea-bargaining, unofficially of course, sometimes involves, for
lack of a better term, judge shopping. The shopping is sometimes
cooperative between defense counsel and the prosecutor, and
sometimes not.
Even the lawyers' egos and ambitions may have an impact on
the availability of plea offers. They may guard their hard-foughtfor successful images and reputations as great defense lawyers or
tough prosecutors. When these factors loom too large, a defendant's opportunity to receive a favorable plea offer might become a
casualty. Some observers assert that the election interests of
elected prosecutors and judges can sometimes affect the nature
and quality of a plea offer. Closely associated with this possible
political impact is that of public outcry and demands in response
to the occasional high-profile crime.
Congress and state legislatures sometime enact legislation to
curtail what they deem to be plea bargaining or procedural outcomes not in the public interest or inconsistent with a particular
sentencing policy or principle they support. In other words, "a pox
on all your houses"-the defense, the prosecution and the judiciary. It is, of course, in the first instance, the duty of legislators
and the executive to establish the statutory framework for their
respective criminal justice system.
Lastly, there is the occasional highly publicized case of a "miscarriage of justice" that is seen as so egregious, the criminal jus-

Summer 2013

Keynote Address

543

tice system itself is brought into question and criticized. The
questions are asked: How could that have happened? How could
an innocent man have been allowed to plead guilty or be convicted
at trial? How could that case have been dismissed or that defendant released? The system's defensive response to such questions
and criticisms might affect future plea-bargains temporarily or for
the foreseeable future.
Those are the stakeholders and that is the arena into which the
Supreme Court stepped in Frye and Lafler, the Court noting that
virtually all criminal cases in federal and state courts result, not
in trials, but instead in guilty pleas. The majority thus concluded
that our criminal justice system is essentially a plea bargaining
system. As a result, the Court, with regard to defense counsel's
performance, extended the reach of the Sixth Amendment to create the right to effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining.
Having declared the right, the Court, with the identified stakeholders and the arena I described as background, stopped short of
fixing a remedy. Thus, the right of effective assistance of counsel
in plea-bargaining is the Court's response to a real problem in our
current criminal justice system, but one still in search of a reasonable and practical solution or remedy.
Two hundred years of applying the principles of the Sixth
Amendment and due process to trials in the determination of fairness have come face to face with the reality of disposition by pleabargain. This meeting of prior Supreme Court interpretation, history, tradition and modem reality in the decisions reached in Frye
and Lafler has resulted in much uncertainty and countless unresolved legal issues, evidenced by the Court's reluctance and difficulty in deciding what the remedy for a violation of this newly recognized right to effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining
should be. The Court even avowed that, perhaps, a remedy might
not even be necessary. This is the dilemma for the Court, and
hence, for the rest of us.
I believe that it can be substantially argued that the majority of
our highest court is beginning to wrestle with the question of what
constitutes fairness in the constitutional sense and in the context
of an acknowledged criminal justice reality-the vast majority of
criminal cases, for all kinds of reasons, are disposed of by plea, not
by trial. Plea bargaining, then, as Justice Kennedy observed, "is
the criminal justice system."
The Court did not, as some would have preferred, criticize disposition by plea-bargaining as an inappropriate means of dispos-
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ing of criminal cases. The Court observed that plea-bargaining is
good for both sides. Justice Scalia in his dissent went further concluding in his view that plea-bargaining allows defendants to get
sentences they do not deserve. However, the Court's approval of
plea-bargaining itself did not mean that the court had no view or
requirement as to what should be considered fair plea-bargaining.
At a minimum, Frye and Lafler teach that fairness in pleabargaining for Sixth Amendment purposes now includes effective
assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining. How limited is this new
right? Is this just the beginning or is this where the Court's concern stops?
There is much to discuss at this conference. Is the right to be
applied narrowly-that is, to only the most egregious failings of
counsel, such as in Frye and Lafler-or will, or should for that
matter, the right be more broadly interpreted and applied? Is the
whole of plea bargaining under review?
All stakeholders have an interest in sound analysis and wellthought-out responses to the Court's newly expressed interest in
plea-bargaining, at least as to the role of defense counsel. By implication, especially in connection with any likely remedy, the
roles of the prosecutor and that of the judge are also involved. The
right might even more broadly involve an expanded role for the
defendant and because of statute or policy, even that of the victim
in certain cases. And, of course, the elephant always in the room
is the Congress and/or state legislatures.
We must also keep in mind the fundamental requirements of
federalism. The country's courts include procedures that involve
both clear separation and some intermingling of federal law and
policy and state law and policy. The responses need not be identical; they need not involve the same approaches or adopt the same
solutions. All courts are limited in resources, both in personnel
and finance, especially in the universally tight budgetary climate
in which we find ourselves.
Since the federal government for criminal justice purposes is organized under a single department of justice and its supervised
United States attorneys, the federal response is less daunting.
Federal criminal courts face comparatively fewer cases, the great
majority of which are initiated at the sole discretion of federal
prosecutors. On the other hand, the states are usually made up
non-unified, independent prosecutorial officers acting in judicial
districts that follow different practices and sometime differ even
within the same court. State courts typically have much larger
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criminal dockets and prosecutors have less discretion and often
fewer resources.
In some state courts, both prosecutors and organizational defenders, if they exist at all, are likely to have hundreds of cases
each. Their extra-trial activities, including plea bargaining, are
often informal, on the fly, or at the last moment. In many jurisdictions, formal arraignment takes place very close to the trial
date. In that circumstance, there is little time left for formality
and documentation. Therefore, any approach or suggested solution in response to Frye and Lafler must be practical in order to be
meaningful, useful and effective. I believe recognition of these
differences and challenges impacted the Court's willingness to
simply provide its own solution. As a result, stakeholders are provided the opportunity to devise workable solutions, which the
Court in the future will approve, disapprove or modify upon further review.
The uncertainty resulting from Frye and Lafler reminds me of
the period beginning in the mid-seventies and extending into the
eighties. This was the period of modern development in Fourth
Amendment law. Years were required for the court to clarify
through its opinions what constituted a reasonable search within
the Fourth Amendment and what were the appropriate exceptions. The Court established guidelines and rules through its ongoing review, and thus gave guidance to the lower courts for their
evaluation of claims of violations. Today, judges, lawyers and
even law enforcement officers have a pretty good understanding of
what the Fourth Amendment requires. However, it did take some
time to get police officers to understand that moving furniture and
digging into drawers and thereafter observing contraband was not
what the Supreme Court meant by "plain view."
Similarly, it will take some time to determine the Sixth
Amendment parameters of effective plea bargaining and to identify the exceptions and what is excluded. However, there is one big
distinction. The stakeholders or the true players with respect to
effective plea-bargaining are not laymen, police officers and the
like, but are trained, experienced lawyers and judges dedicated to
fairness. For reason of this distinction, should we expect a faster
resolution of the issues and a more rapid adoption of appropriate
procedures? Only time will tell, but our profession has a great
opporiunity to demonstrate the important and valuable role lawyers play and can play in improving our actual criminal justice
system.
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The current, open-ended opportunity to devise appropriate solutions also reminds me of Army Officers Basic School. During
training, we were divided into small teams. Each team would be
given an assignment, which the initial team leader had to plan
and lead in its execution. Predictably, at some stage during the
execution, fate or adversity would befall or deal a blow to our initial fearless leader. Then, the instructor/observer would immediately select one of the remaining members of the team to be the
new leader and charged to carry on with the plan. The frightful
question was unfailingly asked of the new leader: "What now,
Lieutenant?" Now that the Supreme Court has spoken, a similar
question arises for defense counsel, prosecutors and judges: "What
now?"
The right to effective plea-bargaining is a right still in the making, a work in progress. As a result, we must, to some extent, devise solutions since the Court has provided so little detail or instruction. As I have earlier suggested, the Court was limited
practically as to what it could reasonably suggest or instruct given
the murky reality of plea bargaining, the lack of uniformity or
standard practices, the different treatment of plea bargaining in
the various trial courts and, not the least of all, the expected difficulties arising from the very expansion and application of traditional Sixth Amendment trial principles to the plea bargaining
phase of criminal proceedings. In fact, arguably the application of
traditional Sixth Amendment law to plea-bargaining flies in the
face of the long and well-established parameters that heretofore
definitively and intentionally excluded plea bargaining. As the
dissenters point out, Frye and Lafler now make the defendants'
"fair" trials irrelevant, where before, fairness of the trial was the
only question that needed to be addressed. Thus, critics of the
decisions point out that not only do the holdings create a new
right, possibly without any remedy, but that they dethrone the
fair trial as the unquestionable and ultimate measure of fairness
in the American criminal justice system.
In considering and reflecting on this new right, I thought of a lot
of questions and issues beyond the basic one of whether the right
is to be interpreted and applied narrowly or broadly. And, I am
sure that many of you have also. My actual list is very long, and
growing, so I will just mention a few:
(1) Beyond the question of effective communication of plea offers, does effective plea-bargaining implicitly involve whether
counsel ever sought or obtained a good, better, best or bad
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bargain? If so, how is that to be determined and what is its
effect on the validity of the case outcome?
(2) Does effective plea-bargaining include an affirmative duty
for counsel to advance or present offers originating with defendant?
(3) Must the content and result of the bargain be placed in the
record? If so, what is the consequence of failing to do so?
(4) Does the judge's acknowledged independence effectively
nullify any reasonable expectation of the defendant for a favorable bargain?
(5) Is effective plea-bargaining effectively limited to binding
plea agreements that the judge can accept or reject (especially
in federal court)?
(6) Are defendant's decisions in accepting or rejecting a plea
offer to be reviewed subjectively or objectively and considered
with or without regard to counsel's actual plea bargaining
skills?
(7) What is the acceptable limit of the impact of ineffective assistance of counsel review on finality in sentencing?
(8) How will Frye and Lafler impact plea offers accepted by
the defendant? In other words, will plea offers clearly accepted by defendants be subject to review of counsel's plea bargaining skills or effectiveness?
(9) What steps will federal trial judges have to take upon remands to avoid running afoul of the rule against judicial involvement in plea bargaining?
(10) Will prosecutors alter their approach to plea-bargaining
in order to avoid limiting their options in the event of a remand?
With regard to remedy, there are some practical solutions that
quickly come to mind. For example, creating forms for documenting the communication of plea offers, acknowledgment of the receipt of offers and their acceptance or rejection and additional
questions to be propounded by the judge during the plea colloquy,
etc. However, even these rather readily available solutions can be
problematic. For example, adding information about offered and
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rejected plea bargains, adding some questions for the judge to ask
during the plea colloquy, can probably be added in federal courts
without a great deal of added work or burden. Extensive, detailed
written plea agreements are the rule rather than the exception
and plea colloquies are already relatively formal and extensive.
Adding a few more questions will not likely matter all that much.
The number of defendants and proceedings are relatively small for
most federal courts.
Change venue and move to the state courts, however, and you
will find vastly increased numbers on all fronts. Therefore, the
addition of significant documentation, its preparation, review, and
additional inquiry or findings by the judge would not only be significant in individual cases but would likely have a large cumulative effect on court proceedings and resources. Also, merely adding documents and asking additional questions will not necessarily significantly reduce claims of ineffective plea bargaining. There
will always be the question, sometimes legitimate, did the defendant really understand? Did he reject or accept the bargain knowingly and voluntarily? Was his rejection substantially affected by
counsel's ineffective plea bargaining? Notwithstanding the many
questions that may not be conclusively answered by a review of
the record, some record is better than no record.
An additional interesting question: Does the rejection of what
could be considered objectively a good bargain result in a presumption that defendant's decision was unknowing and involuntary? Can a defendant make, for the lack of a better term, a
knowing and voluntary stupid decision? Will the defendant, in
effect, be allowed to argue that "obviously my attorney did not do a
good job explaining things to me because I clearly would have accepted the offer, if he had"?
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has left it to the trials courts,
along with those directly involved, to work out the details, the procedures and the relief, if any. I think the majority acknowledges
that this new right will be applied on uneven legal terrain and
that there are many possible, acceptable and adequate approaches
and outcomes. Therefore, I expect many trial courts to take a position first on just how broadly they should apply the Court's holdings and, based on that determination, will take the steps they
believe at least minimally meet the requirements of this new right
as they see it.
Defense attorneys will probably take additional steps to document their communication of offers and their clients' acknowl-
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edgment and decision. And if for no reason other than to protect
their criminal judgments, so will prosecutors. There is likely to be
an increase in written offers and agreements and trial judges are
more likely to make plea bargain inquiries on the record and possibly make additional findings.
The greatest challenges, as I believe most of us can agree, will
be determination of the necessity of a remedy upon remand and if
so, fashioning an appropriate remedy. What steps will be taken to
provide an adequate procedure or record where relief is denied?
Thus more attention will necessarily be given to the record.
Of course the appellate courts will perform their review obligation and make their assessment. From a review of this dynamic
process, the Supreme Court will more clearly delineate what it
means by effective plea-bargaining and its adequacy for Sixth
Amendment purposes as it more realistically evaluates the real
criminal justice system, plea bargaining.
In conclusion, the Court in Frye and Lafler has identified ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining as a real problem
in the current reality of our criminal justice system. It is a significant right, whose creation is intended to address this real problem, but a right nonetheless yet in search of a reasonable and
practical solution. In seeking that solution, we have been given
the opportunity to carefully assess our commitment to fairness in
this system we all acknowledge. Ideally, just as we have figured
out largely what it means to have a fair trial, we will have to figure out what it means to have a criminal case disposed of through
effective plea-bargaining, that is, fair plea-bargaining. A key
component of fair plea bargaining is unquestionably competent
and effective counsel. But we all, defense lawyers, prosecutors,
judges and scholars have a part to play in finding our way.
Will we require further prodding by the Supreme Court or will
we take affirmative steps to guarantee fairness, effectiveness, in
plea bargaining? Based on the commitment, resources and energy
given to the planning and presentation of this conference, I believe
there is a very good possibility that we will. I certainly hope so.
Those are some of my thoughts, some of my views. WHAT
NOW, PROFESSORS?
Thank you.

